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Forest conservation through markets? A discourse network analysis of the 
debate on funding mechanisms for REDD+ in Brazil 
 
Abstract 
One of the most contentious issues surrounding the forest conservation program REDD+ is the 
question whether it should be funded via international carbon markets. The controversy between 
market supporters and opponents has been especially marked in the public debate in Brazil, one of 
the main potential beneficiaries of REDD+ payments. In a remarkable shift of policy, the Brazilian 
Federal Government gave up its long-standing opposition to market-based funding in the run-up to 
the COP15, following several years of competition between two main discourse coalitions and their 
preferred story lines. These were analyzed here with discourse network analytical techniques. Brazil’s 
policy change may in part be explained by the failure of market opponents to employ positive 
arguments about alternative funding mechanisms, such as a public fund model; and by the increasing 
discursive dominance of a third emerging discourse coalition, which adopted major arguments of both 
sides in the debate. The research presented here thus provides more general insights on the dynamics 
of public debates, discourse coalitions, and the impacts of discursive strategies on policy-making, as 
well as on the value of discourse network analysis as a research method. 
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Moutinho defends the implementation of REDD as a compensatory market mechanism 
[…]: “How can we guarantee sustainability without markets?” […] it is already 
difficult enough to obtain money for humanitarian interventions in Africa. Now 
imagine, to save forests in Brazil. 
(Escobar, 2009a, translated) 
 
Introduction 
Ten years ago, Brazil witnessed an intensive public debate around suitable funding sources for REDD 
(Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries), a policy 
mechanism first proposed at the UN climate change conference COP11 in Montréal in 2005, to 
combine the benefits of forest conservation with climate change mitigation (Cerbu et al., 2011).1 The 
main objective of REDD is to compensate developing countries financially for maintaining their 
forests standing, with the intention to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions (Alexander, 2018). As 
such, REDD (or nowadays REDD+, which has a wider scope)2 belongs to the group of carbon-based 
conservation mechanisms within the wider family of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) 
schemes (Corbera, 2012). While there is a diversity of definitions and on-the-ground variation in the 
implementation of REDD schemes, they are generally built on the idea that funders from developed 
countries make a payment to governments or conservation projects in developing countries in 
                                                 
1 At COP11, the mechanism was initially abbreviated as “RED”, which was expanded to “REDD” to include forest 
degradation at COP13 in Bali 2007 (Cerbu et al., 2011). 
2 REDD+ stands for “reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role 
of conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing 
countries” (Alexander, 2018: 616). 
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exchange for a guarantee to conserve a clearly defined area of forest, and in this way, provide the 
regulating ecosystem service of carbon storage (Corbera, 2012). 
Carbon-based conservation has attracted widespread interest and controversy among policy-
makers, academics, and potential beneficiaries in developing countries. While in principle, the 
objectives of forest conservation and climate change mitigation are universally accepted, there has 
been considerable debate about how to best achieve these, and whether REDD schemes constitute a 
viable and desirable option (Cabello & Gilbertson, 2012; Corbera, 2012; Lederer, 2011; McGregor et 
al., 2014). In the official definition of REDD+, the term “conservation” is included as a separate term 
alongside other terms and forest management strategies (Alexander, 2018), yet in this article, all 
REDD/REDD+ activities are interpreted as ultimately seeking to contribute to “conservation” of 
forests and carbon stocks. In this sense, REDD is seen as one option among several other forest 
conservation mechanisms, for example integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs), 
despite the special focus on reducing deforestation and forest degradation rates (Angelsen, 2008). 
A number of concerns regarding the conservation of forests by reducing deforestation and 
forest degradation rates as envisioned by REDD proponents have been voiced. Among others, these 
relate to the technological difficulties in quantifying and monitoring carbon contents and compliance 
with conservation agreements (Herold et al., 2011; Olander et al., 2012); the risk of managing for 
carbon conservation only to the detriment of other ecosystem functions, as well as biodiversity 
(Harrison et al., 2012; Paoli et al., 2010); unclear sources of permanent funds to ensure conservation 
beyond the end of project contracts (May & Millikan, 2010; Peskett et al., 2011); the displacement of 
environmentally harmful activities to other areas not covered by conservation agreements, also known 
as “leakage” (Atmadja & Verchot, 2012; Kuik, 2014); the challenges in distributing payments 
equitably among local people in forest communities, considering that communities are far from a 
homogenous actors (Kariuki et al., 2018; Krause et al., 2013); the problem that much deforestation is 
already illegal anyway and payments for not breaking the law would be legally and morally 
questionable (Angelsen, 2008; Pearce, 2008); more general ethical and moral concerns about 
changing people’s relationships with the natural environment through the adoption of a utilitarian 
logic implicit in REDD and PES (Benjaminsen & Kaarhus, 2018; Sconfienza, 2017); and about 
changing rural people’s relationships with the state (Gebara & Agrawal, 2017). 
Brazil hosts the world’s largest contiguous area of tropical rainforest in its Amazon region. It 
has also been battling with the issue of deforestation for decades, due to illegal logging, the advance 
of cattle ranching, expansion of agricultural areas, road construction, and mining, among other factors 
(Fearnside, 2005; Moran, 1993; Perz et al., 2008). As such, Brazilian perspectives and policies on 
REDD carry additional weight in the global debate about carbon-based forest conservation, and the 
idea has attracted significant attention among Brazilian academics and policy-makers. One crucial 
question for REDD, that continues to be of relevance today, is the source of funds that will pay for 
forest conservation. While economic valuation exercises regularly produce high estimates of the 
monetary worth of e.g. the Amazon rainforest (Strand et al., 2017), in practice, available funds for 
forest conservation are much more limited. 
In Brazil, as in many other countries, debates about funding for REDD centered on the 
question whether market-based funding sources would be desirable and appropriate, or whether 
REDD should instead be paid for by public funds, managed by government institutions. Such public 
funds would principally emerge from developed countries, as part of their commitments in mitigating 
global climate change (van der Hoff et al., 2018). While most carbon markets are also managed by 
the public sector, payments are typically made by the private sector in exchange for greenhouse gas 
emission permits (Newell et al., 2014). In Brazil, NGOs, academics, government representatives, and 
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other relevant stakeholders were divided on this matter, and vocally supported or opposed the idea of 
either carbon markets or public funds for REDD. 
During most of the build-up to the Copenhagen climate change conference 2009, the Brazilian 
Federal Government led by President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva opposed the idea of carbon market-
financed forest conservation. Instead, the government favored the creation of voluntary incentives for 
reducing deforestation, unrelated to the emission reduction goals of industrialized countries. This 
eventually resulted in the creation of an “Amazon Fund” in 2008, which manages donor funds from 
Norway and Germany to implement REDD+ projects in Brazil (van der Hoff et al., 2018). However, 
the governors of nine Brazilian states located in the Amazon Basin protested against the Federal 
Government’s REDD strategy in an open letter in June 2009, demanding Brazil’s participation in 
international carbon markets. This led to the creation of a task force composed of members of different 
government agencies in mid-2009, which recommended the adoption of multiple funding 
mechanisms for REDD, including carbon markets allowing the compensation of industrialized 
countries’ emissions via REDD (May & Millikan, 2010). In a remarkable turn of events, the Federal 
Government dropped its opposition to international carbon markets, and supported a restrictive 
integration of REDD into carbon markets at COP15 in Copenhagen. This would have allowed the 
compensation of up to 10% of an industrialized country’s emission reduction goals via REDD carbon 
credits from Brazil, if that country had already met at least 70% of their emission reduction 
commitments from the Kyoto Protocol (Ninni, 2009).  
Even if we now know that a breakthrough for a global climate treaty was only to be achieved 
several years later with the Paris Agreement, it is still worth interrogating how such a significant 
change in the Brazilian government’s policy position on REDD was possible in Copenhagen, a 
conference widely expected to produce a binding global climate change treaty at the time. Not least, 
the Brazilian government’s change of position has also had practical impacts as a bill was introduced 
to the Brazilian congress in 2010 to allow private landowners to market carbon credits from avoided 
deforestation (May & Millikan, 2010), even if the many practical issues associated with the 
implementation of REDD (summarized above) have prevented it from becoming a widespread forest 
conservation strategy in the Brazilian Amazon to date. 
The role of markets for environmental conservation lies at the heart of many debates between 
academics, conservationists, and policy-makers today (Humphreys, 2009; Martin-Ortega et al., 2019; 
Pirard, 2012; Robertson, 2004), and has led to ideological splits between supporters and opponents 
of such a funding and environmental management model. Supporters of market funding view it as an 
efficient and effective solution to the problem of insufficient funds for environmental conservation, 
including forest conservation (Engel et al., 2008). Opponents are often concerned about the risk of 
commodification of the environment, in the wider context of neoliberalization (McAfee, 2012). 
Crucially, preferences for or against markets as funding sources for public policy are generally 
interpreted as a matter that transcends various political actors’ rational and substantive interests e.g. 
for more or less environmental protection (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Thus, the topic lends itself to 
an analysis primarily based at the level of ideas, frames, thoughts, and narratives, as pursued here. 
The present article seeks to contribute to the analysis of debates around the role of markets 
for carbon-based forest conservation by presenting a case study on the public debate on REDD in 
Brazil in the period between 2007 and 2009. Despite a considerable body of academic literature on 
REDD and carbon markets, there is much less research about public views on funding mechanisms 
for REDD, as expressed by statements made by relevant stakeholders in the media. Objectives of the 
study presented here are: to empirically identify narrative elements of this debate; to understand how 
they are linked with each other and with the actors who participate in the debate; and to explore how 
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such relational dynamics between discourses and stakeholders may have contributed to a shift in the 
Brazilian Federal Government’s policy preferences, which may offer insights on the characteristics 
of “successful” discursive strategies. Theoretically, this study is based on discourse analytical 
approaches, especially the idea of “discourse coalitions”, originally proposed by Hajer (1995), which 
refers to groups of actors that employ similar discursive strategies and their preferred narratives. To 
identify these discourse coalitions, “discourse network analysis” is used as a method, which 
represents an application of the techniques of social network analysis to the level of ideas, frames, 
and narratives in public debates (Leifeld, 2018). Here, the Discourse Network Analyzer (DNA) 
software was used for the analysis of 71 newspaper articles on REDD published in four Brazilian 
newspapers during the study period (see further details below). Overall, the article shows how 
different discourse coalitions employed various story lines in the public debate on funding 
mechanisms for REDD, and in this way, may have contributed to the policy shift in the Brazilian 
Federal Government’s official position at the COP15 in Copenhagen 2009. 
 
Theoretical background: discourse analysis and discourse coalitions 
Many different theories for explaining policy change exist (see e.g. Béland & Howlett, 2016; Mintrom 
& Norman, 2009; Sabatier & Weible, 2007), and it is clear that no single approach can explain shifts 
in governments’ positions alone. Nevertheless, it is worth analyzing specific elements of the public 
policy process, which may at least partly explain such change. In the present study, the analytical 
focus is placed on the discursive level, based on the rich theoretical tradition of discourse analytical 
approaches (e.g. Fischer, 2003; Hajer, 1995; Humphreys, 2009; Leifeld, 2018; Rantala & Di Gregorio, 
2014). It has been argued that discourses may be particularly relevant for explaining policy change 
where policy issues are highly politicized and controversial (Leifeld & Haunss, 2012), as has been 
the case in the debate around funding mechanisms for REDD in Brazil. 
Hajer (1995: p. 60) defines a discourse as “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and 
categorizations that is produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and 
through which meaning is given to physical and social realities”. A widespread contemporary 
example is the “sustainability discourse”. The widely used concept of discourse coalitions (e.g. 
Bulkeley, 2000; Rantala & Di Gregorio, 2014; Rennkamp et al., 2017; Steinfeld, 2016), in turn, also 
includes the actors who voice specific discourses (and who may or may not actively communicate 
with each other). It is defined as an “ensemble of (1) a set of story lines; (2) the actors who utter these 
story lines; and (3) the practices in which this discursive activity is based” (Hajer, 1995: p. 66).  
Discourse analysts typically stress that discourses are not merely means for the 
communication of actors’ interests or underlying belief systems, but should instead be understood as 
various definitions of reality, which can obtain novel meanings in discursive exchanges and which 
may have practical implications. In this context, the development of new policies is interpreted as the 
result of an argumentative competition between several discourse coalitions of public and private 
actors, who are all competing for hegemony in their interpretation of reality (Hajer, 1995; Leifeld & 
Haunss, 2012). In this sense, the idea of discourse coalitions is conceptually close to “advocacy 
coalitions”, as proposed by the “Advocacy Coalition Framework” (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). These 
are groups of political actors who share certain beliefs and compete with other coalitions for the 
adoption of their preferred policy.3 
To achieve hegemony, the various elements of a discourse, which Hajer (1995) calls “story 
                                                 
3 There are also some theoretical differences between the two types of coalitions, see Bulkeley (2000) for a detailed 
discussion. 
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lines”, need to have certain positive characteristics, such as a credibility and acceptability, should be 
associated with trustworthy sources, and ideally, support a variety of different political positions. The 
rhetorical elements of a discourse are not narrowly defined, but can broadly refer to metaphors, ideas, 
stories, and specific arguments. As such, they may also include what sociologists have called “frames” 
(Leifeld & Haunss, 2012), i.e. shared interpretations of reality that simplify and condense “the world 
out there” by offering problem definitions, corresponding solutions, and associated strategies 
(Benford & Snow, 2000).  
Crucially, discourse theories assume that discourses are relatively consistently made up of 
given sets of arguments, frames, or story lines, and that mentioning one of the elements implicitly 
invokes the other elements of a discourse (Hajer, 1995). This suggests that studying interlinkages 
between various arguments is relevant and necessary to understand discourse hegemony, and the 
“success” of discourse coalitions. Indicators for success are, among others, their stability, in the sense 
of their members and associated story lines, their distinctiveness from other discourse coalitions, and 
the number of stakeholders that subscribe to their discourses. Moreover, they use the central 
arguments of a debate, connect them to a consistent story line, and employ a broad, but not overly 
broad spectrum of arguments (Leifeld & Haunss, 2012). Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that 
an individual case study using discourse network analytical techniques does not produce conclusive 
or incontestable findings regarding the factors that determine such discursive “success”. Instead, it 
serves to generate plausible explanations or general “hypotheses” on the basis of empirical data that 
could subsequently be “tested” through a meta-analysis of a large number of discourse network 
analyses. 
 
Methodological approach: discourse network analysis and the Discourse Network Analyzer 
Discourse network analysis and the associated Discourse Network Analyzer (DNA) software 
represent a relatively recent methodological approach for the empirical analysis of the role of 
discourses, ideas, and frames in political decision-making processes (Leifeld, 2018). This method 
allows the operationalization of discourse analytical theories by tracing the relationships between 
different concepts (i.e. elements of discourses), as well as between concepts and political actors (i.e. 
discourse coalitions) in written material such as newspaper articles. To do so, the researcher codes 
contents of a text into “statements”, which may represent an individual argument in a discourse. Every 
statement is also assigned to a certain actor, for example, an individual person or a specific 
organization. This technique generates network analytical information, as some arguments will be 
frequently employed by the same actor, or some actors will frequently employ the same arguments. 
Using the DNA software in conjunction with a network visualization software such as Visone 
(Brandes & Wagner, 2004) allows to represent these connections as concept or actor networks in the 
form of (usually highly complex) graphs. These can be interpreted visually, as well as mathematically, 
with quantitative indicators developed for social network analysis (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). This 
way, discourse network analysis adds a more formal methodological toolkit to the broader family of 
discourse analytical approaches (Muller, 2015). Not least, the visual representation of networks 
allows to condense highly complex information about connections between people and ideas into an 
accessible format, which would be impossible to achieve in the form of qualitative descriptions or 
more conventional, hypothesis-testing statistical approaches (Stoddart et al., 2017). 
For the present case study, the DNA software was used to identify relevant statements of actors 
in the public debate on funding mechanisms for REDD in Brazil in the run-up to the COP15 in 
Copenhagen 2009. 302 statements were identified in 71 articles from four different Brazilian 
newspapers (O Estado de S.Paulo, O Globo, Folha de S.Paulo and Valor Econômico). These are all 
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general daily national newspapers which had an estimated daily readership above 1,000,000 people 
at the time (May et al., 2011). An exception is Valor Econômico, which specializes in news about the 
economy, and was selected to complement the more general newspapers due to the research focus on 
funding mechanisms. Thus, criteria for the selection of newspapers were their nationwide circulation, 
general importance, and their coverage of REDD during the study period (see also May et al., 2011). 
The 302 statements were made by 45 different actors (see appendix 1) and classified as three policy 
preferences and 21 categories of arguments (see Figure 1 below). As an example, the quote by Paulo 
Moutinho cited above was coded twice with the DNA software: First, as a policy preference 
(integration of REDD into carbon emission markets) and second, as an argumentative category 
justifying this policy preference (in this case “sustainability, financial incentives, and security through 
markets”).  
Naming of categories of arguments followed both inductive and deductive procedures, as is 
common in discourse network analysis (Hurka & Nebel, 2013). While some categories were named 
deductively after existing arguments from the academic literature on REDD in Brazil (e.g. “leakage” 
or “permanence”), the majority of categories were compiled inductively during the analysis of 
newspaper articles. Policy preferences were classified into three categories: (i) a public fund for 
REDD, i.e. a voluntary funding model based on donations from developed countries, which was 
initially favored by the Brazilian government; (ii) integration of REDD into carbon markets, which 
would allow the unlimited sale of REDD carbon credits in the international trade of emissions 
permits; and (iii) restrictive integration of REDD into carbon markets, which would impose certain 
restrictions on the trade of REDD carbon credits to reduce potential negative effects. This last label 
included the final proposal of Brazil’s Federal Government at the COP15 as described in the 
introduction above. Furthermore, it was recorded whether an actor supported or opposed the 
respective policy option. 
While the overall number of articles on REDD in the above-mentioned newspaper articles at 
289 significantly exceeded the number of articles used for the discourse analysis presented here (71), 
the vast majority were unsuitable, as they did not contain statements on preferred funding sources for 
REDD. Another issue were duplicates or repetitions between several articles, were journalists relied 
on the same original source of information. Articles were identified with the keyword REDD on the 
respective newspapers’ websites – an additional search with keywords such as “deforestation” did not 
produce any further results, given that no newspaper article could report on funding sources for 
REDD without also using the acronym.  
All articles were published between 2007 and 2009. News reports about COP13 on Bali 
marked the beginning of the covered period, since REDD was first officially proposed there. The 
period ends with news about COP15 in Copenhagen, where the shift in the Brazilian Federal 
Government’s policy position occurred as the variable of interest here, which could not have been 
influenced by discussions that continued after COP15, and indeed continue until the present day. 
Since expectations for an agreement on a new international climate change treaty were especially 
high in 2009, most articles were published in that year (i.e. 77%). Also, there was a much larger 
number of events and conferences on REDD in 2009, and consequently, a larger number of actors 
participated in the debate. In general, not only statements by Brazilian actors were coded, but also 
international and foreign actors were included in the database, given that coverage of their views on 
funding for REDD in the Brazilian media made them part of the public debate on REDD in Brazil. 
This is further supported by Kasa’s (2013) finding that the Brazilian debate on REDD was strongly 
influenced by statements made by international actors. 
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Results: story lines, discourse coalitions, and policy change 
This section presents and analyses the empirical findings of the conducted discourse network analysis. 
First, it identifies the main arguments used in the Brazilian debate around funding mechanisms for 
REDD, and discusses how these can be interpreted as two main contrasting story lines either in favor 
or in opposition to market-based funding mechanisms. Second, it outlines the evolution of discourse 
coalitions in the public debate, which began with an argumentative struggle between market 
opponents and supporters, and evolved towards a more fragmented scenario with three main discourse 
coalitions (including a neutral, compromise-seeking coalition) participating in the debate. Third, it 
discusses a number of potential explanations for policy change, based on the empirical findings about 
the public debate on REDD in Brazil presented here. 
 
Story lines 
Story lines are groups of arguments that are frequently linked in public debates and discourses, and 
in this way, form a coherent story. Thus, it is often sufficient to mention one argument in a debate to 
implicitly invoke the other arguments that are typically used alongside it (Hajer, 1995). Story lines, 
made up of arguments or frames, thus serve to reduce the complexity of reality in public debates, and 
to signal the political position of an actor. Whereas there is continuing debate in how far discourses 
can be understood separately of the actors voicing them or not (Arts & Buizer, 2009), story lines are 
located entirely at the conceptual level.  
Figure 1: Arguments used in the debate on funding mechanisms for REDD in Brazil 2007-2009. Each node represents one argument 
used in the debate and each line linking two nodes means that at least one actor used both arguments. Frequency of use is indicated 
by position, with frequent arguments in the center and rare arguments on the margins. Node size indicates the degree (i.e. number of 
links with other arguments). Line weight indicates number of actors sharing two arguments. 
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For the present study, a “concept congruence network” was generated from the empirical data 
on REDD funding in Brazil (Figure 1). In this type of network, lines are drawn between two concepts 
or “nodes” (here, arguments used), if they were both mentioned by the same actor. The Visone 
software allows to visualize the strength of connection between two arguments by color gradient and 
line width, i.e., the thicker and darker a line, the higher the number of actors who used a combination 
of both arguments to defend their policy position. A weight of 3, for example, indicates that three 
actors have shared a specific set of two arguments.  
Figure 1 suggests the existence of two main separate story lines in the debate on funding 
mechanisms for REDD in Brazil, in which a number of arguments are connected with each other by 
lines with a weight of at least 2. The two story lines can be linked to two policy positions, either in 
favor or in opposition to market-based funding for REDD (see Table 1). One core argument is used 
as part of both story lines (i.e. that industrialized countries should prioritize reducing their own 
emissions), which suggests that most actors felt the need to use it to achieve credibility. In the words 
of Hajer (1995: p. 64), its power may lie in the fact that it “sounds right”; i.e. one would not intuitively 
disagree with this argument. In sociological terms, it could be understood as a “master frame”, that 
is, it is generic and flexible enough to allow multiple interpretations (Benford & Snow, 2000). On the 
one hand, it could be interpreted as a moral argument about the historic responsibility of industrialized 
countries for causing climate change (see also Müller et al., 2009). In the analyzed newspaper articles, 
the moral dimension of this argument is often emphasized by replacing the words “industrialized 
countries” and “developing countries” simply with “the rich” and “the poor” (see also Zhouri, 2010: 
p. 261). On the other hand, it can be interpreted as a practical argument about the need to reduce 
emissions where they are highest (i.e. in industrialized countries). While this argument does not 
preclude the idea of REDD (since even if industrialized countries reduce emissions in their own 
country first, reducing deforestation in developing countries can still be seen as a worthwhile 
additional activity), it still has stronger links with arguments against integrating REDD into carbon 
markets. 
Table 1: Story lines used in the debate on funding mechanisms for REDD in Brazil 2007-2009 
Story line 1: ‘pro markets’ Story line 2: ‘against markets’ 
Industrialized countries should prioritize reducing their own emissions 
Sustainability, security, and financial 
incentives through markets 
Market solution threatens global emission 
reduction targets 
Industrialized countries should pay for 
emission reductions in developing countries 
Markets reward illegal or morally 
questionable behavior 
Standing forests need to have value Decline of carbon credit prices due to 
inclusion of REDD 
Market solution is technically feasible Oil nations would demand compensation in 
case of market solution 
End of deforestation as a political goal  




The “pro-markets story line” unites a diverse range of arguments, with a number of functions. 
The claim that industrialized countries should pay for emissions reductions in developing countries 
attributes blame, and is again based on the idea that industrialized countries are historically 
responsible for climate change. It makes use of intuitive and pragmatic arguments, which are open to 
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multiple interpretations, such as that standing forests need to be valued (cf. Strand et al., 2017), and 
that an international agreement including Brazil is essential. It also offers a solution and concrete 
strategy to a political problem, i.e. it suggests that a market solution for REDD is technically feasible, 
and may end deforestation in Brazil. Not least, it also incorporates the universally popular 
“sustainability” buzzword, here linked to its financial dimension, which may be seen as lending 
credibility to the arguments. These strengths may have contributed to eventually swaying the 
Brazilian Federal Government towards accepting market funding. 
In contrast to that, the “story line against markets” uses a mix of moral arguments and 
warnings about potential practical risks, such as that markets would reward illegal or morally 
questionable behavior (because only 20% of a forest within any private property in the Amazon can 
be felled legally anyway; May & Millikan, 2010) or that the inclusion of REDD credits into carbon 
markets would cause a decline in prices. Such a decline in prices would then render carbon markets 
ineffectual, and in this way, threaten global emission reduction targets. In newspapers, this line of 
arguments was sometimes simplified by the expression “the numbers don’t add up” (a conta não 
fecha; see e.g. Escobar, 2009b), i.e. suggesting that global emissions would increase if REDD credits 
could be used to avoid some emission reductions in industrialized countries. A further risk towards a 
decline in prices is highlighted by the argument that oil nations might feel emboldened in their claims 
for integration of credits for avoided emissions from not exploiting known oil reserves into carbon 
markets, see e.g. the debate about Ecuador’s Yasuní-ITT initiative (Espinosa, 2013; Larrea & 
Warnars, 2009). It is noteworthy that the story line against markets only highlights negative 
consequences of integrating REDD into carbon markets, but does not mention the positives of 
alternative policy options, such as e.g. a public fund model.  
Overall, it appears that arguments both in support and opposition to market-based funding for 
REDD are well represented in the two main story lines, and that neither side is obviously dominant, 
even if arguments in favor of markets appeared more varied. To understand the impact of these story 
lines on policy, it is thus necessary to investigate their linkages with political actors (see section on 
discourse coalitions below). Due to limitations of space, the further arguments used in the public 
debate will not be discussed here. It is nevertheless interesting to observe that central arguments of 
the academic debate on REDD, such as leakage of deforestation elsewhere, the issue of finding 
permanent funding sources, or discussions about Brazil’s national sovereignty and control over the 
Amazon region (e.g. Lahsen, 2009; Zhouri, 2010) are relatively insignificant in the public debate. 
 
Discourse coalitions 
Discourse coalitions consist of story lines and the actors voicing them. They compete with other 
discourse coalitions for hegemony of their interpretation of reality (Hajer, 1995; Rennkamp et al., 
2017). In the present study, the subject of this competition is evidently the role of carbon markets for 
funding REDD projects in Brazil; and “success” would be defined as shaping Brazil’s official policy 
position on funding mechanisms for REDD at the COP15. From this, three discourse coalitions can 
be constructed, which differ based on whether they hold positive, negative, or neutral attitudes 
towards carbon markets as a potential funding source for REDD. To some extent, these attitudes are 
implicit in the arguments used to construct the two dominant story lines outlined in the preceding 
section.  
Nevertheless, here, actors were classified into these three discourse coalitions via their explicit 
policy preferences (see appendix 1 for the exact classification of actors), as stated in the analyzed 
newspaper articles, and linkages between actors and arguments were identified entirely based on the 
empirical material as well. This, because the change in the Brazilian government’s policy preference 
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was the main “dependent variable” of interest, to be (partially) explained by the “independent 
variable” of the dynamics of the public debate. Where actors agreed to both public funds and markets 
as funding mechanisms, this was classified as a neutral attitude, since it appeared that the actor did 
not have a strong preference either way, and rather emphasized the need to find a funding source at 
all. Similarly, if an actor supported a restrictive integration of REDD into carbon markets (which 
suggests neither full support nor opposition), then the actor was allocated to the neutral coalition. No 
attempt was made to identify the strength of support or opposition or to further distinguish sub-groups 
of actors within coalitions. 
The most important actors of the coalition against markets were the Brazilian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Greenpeace, as well as several Brazilian NGOs. The most important actors of the 
pro-market coalition were the subnational governments of states in the Brazilian Amazon, 
international actors such as the US delegation at COPs, the World Bank, as well as a number of 
Brazilian and international NGOs. Neutral actors were the Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry 
of Science and Technology, as well as a small number of actors from other sectors. The position of 
the Brazilian Federal Government reflected the position of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
until August 2009, i.e. it opposed a market solution. Statements made afterwards were classified as 
pertaining to the neutral discourse coalition, since its position shifted towards that of the Ministry of 
the Environment. In this sense, the policy shift reflects a power shift towards the Ministry of the 
Environment as well (see also Lahsen, 2009; Zhouri, 2010). 
To identify the argumentative strategies of these three discourse coalitions, “affiliation 
networks” are most suitable. These are so-called “two-mode networks”, i.e. there are two types of 
nodes (Leifeld, 2018), here, actor groups and arguments. In Figures 2 and 3, actors were grouped into 
three coalitions, with the lines indicating agreement (in green) and disagreement (in red) with certain 
arguments. This facilitates the analysis of how arguments were employed by the respective discourse 
coalition, and which conflicts were present at the discursive level. The size of nodes indicates 
statement frequency for both arguments and actors. 
The two affiliation networks in Figures 2 and 3 cover two different “time slices” (Leifeld, 
2018). This serves to verify whether there were changes in argumentative strategies over the course 
of the debate and whether these might be linked to changes in public policy. The first time slice, from 
5 December 2007 to 11 August 2009 can be interpreted as a phase of policy stability, in which the 
government consistently rejected the integration of REDD into carbon markets. The second time slice, 
from 12 August 2009 to 17 December 2009 can be seen as a phase of policy change, since a 
willingness for compromise by the Brazilian government was evident from the fact that it suggested 
a combination of policies, i.e. of using public funds as well as integrating REDD in emissions markets 
as first reported by Krieger (2009). This eventually resulted in the known compromise to propose a 
restrictive integration of REDD in carbon markets. The cut-off date was thus selected based on 
Krieger’s (2009) account of a shift in the Brazilian government’s position, which was announced at 
an informal UNFCCC meeting in Bonn, Germany, in preparation for COP15. In general, the selection 
of cut-off dates for time slices in discourse network analyses is dependent on the specific dynamics 
of a public debate and on research objectives (Leifeld & Haunss, 2012). 
As can be seen in Figure 2, the first phase was characterized by conflicts at the discursive 
level, and the previously identified story lines correspond well with discourse coalitions. The conflict 
concerns mainly two arguments: the argument whether markets would reward illegal or morally 
questionable behavior, and, to a lesser extent, the argument about threats to global emission reduction 
targets, which form part of the story line against markets. This suggests that market proponents were 
trying to dismantle or reframe the Brazilian Federal Government’s preferred story line. For example, 
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a researcher at the Federal University of Minas Gerais suggested that: “Without this type of incentive 
[i.e. REDD], nobody would comply with the law. Brazil has excellent laws, but they do not match 
our reality. Those who behave lawfully are penalized, because they are always disadvantaged in 
comparison with the illegals.” (Escobar, 2008, translated). 
 
 
Figure 2: Discourse coalitions in phase 1 (5 December 2007 – 11 August 2009). Actors were grouped into three discourse coalitions 
according to their policy preferences. Blue nodes represent arguments used in the debate. Node size represents frequency of use of 
arguments. Green lines indicate agreement of an actor with an argument, red lines indicate disagreement. 
 
In contrast, Figure 3 shows how the neutral discourse coalition took a much more prominent 
position in the second phase analyzed here. It now connects the central arguments of all coalitions 
within one group, among others, that markets threaten global emission reduction targets, that 
Figure 3: Discourse coalitions in phase 2 (12 August 2009 - 17 December 2009). See caption of Figure 2 for explanations. 
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industrialized countries should prioritize reducing their own emissions, and that a market solution 
would bring sustainability, security, and financial incentives for forest conservation.  
 
Explanations for policy stability and change 
Discourse network analysis is a method that is especially suitable for the explanation of dynamic 
processes of change, given that arguments, frames, and ideas used in the public debate are 
continuously evolving and interacting (Leifeld, 2018). Here, this evolution of arguments used by three 
different discourse coalitions was mapped for two different periods of time (Figures 2 and 3), which 
suggested that the change in the Brazilian Federal Government’s position on funding mechanisms for 
REDD between 2007 and 2009 went along with a change in discursive strategies as well.  
The comparatively longer phase 1 from 5 December 2007 to 11 August 2009 was 
characterized by a stalemate between market opponents and supporters as well as policy stability, that 
is, the Brazilian Federal Government consistently opposed the integration of REDD into carbon 
markets. Figure 2 suggests that no particular story line dominated the public debate in phase 1, even 
though the government’s position was constantly under attack from multiple influential critics. The 
policy of opposing market funding represented continuity for the Brazilian government, which had 
already opposed the mention of avoided deforestation in the context of the Kyoto protocol in 1997 
(May & Millikan, 2010), mostly due to concerns of the military and Ministry of Foreign Affairs about 
maintaining national sovereignty in the sparsely populated regions of the Amazon (Lahsen, 2009; 
Zhouri, 2010). In the absence of a more powerful story line or framing strategy, the pro-market 
discourse coalition was unable to induce policy change. Furthermore, its actors lacked the legal and 
political clout of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was dominant within the Brazilian Federal 
Government (and the coalition against markets) at the time (Lahsen, 2009).  
In contrast to that, the much shorter phase 2 from 12 August 2009 to 17 December 2009 was 
a period of policy change characterized by a much more intense public debate about funding 
mechanisms for REDD, with 145 statements coded in phase 2 as opposed to 157 in phase 1. The shift 
in the Brazilian Federal Government’s position is remarkable, given that journalists reported 
continued opposition of the powerful Ministry of Foreign Affairs against a market solution during 
this period. This suggests, that other factors, including shifts in the public debate may indeed at least 
be partly responsible for this policy change, which can be understood as a failure of the coalition 
against markets to maintain its hegemonic position over time. 
On the discursive level, the failure of the story line (and discourse coalition) against markets 
can be understood as a failure to formulate positive solutions for a pressing policy problem. While 
they consistently warned about many different risks of markets, they did not use any positive 
arguments to support e.g. a donation-based public fund model for REDD. Effectively, this meant that 
their story line against policy change was associated with the status quo rather than an alternative 
possible future for forest conservation; yet the policies of the status quo in Brazil were not widely 
perceived as being successful at preventing deforestation (as lower deforestation rates at the time 
were typically attributed to reduced global demand for agricultural commodities; May & Millikan, 
2010), and this may have rendered the story line against markets unattractive. Indeed, several 
discourse analysts and framing experts have suggested that one of the most severe argumentative 
failures in public debates is the lack of proposing political solutions or “prognostic frames” of what 
the future should look like (Benford & Snow, 2000; Fischer, 2003).  
A further failure of the discourse coalition against markets may have been its lacking use of 
arguments that would make reference to Brazilian interests, as opposed to more general global 
concerns. Especially the emphasis on sustainability and financial security through markets by the pro-
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market story line is based on the material interests of Brazil and its forest owners, who were hoping 
for potentially considerable income streams (Kasa, 2013; Ninni, 2009).  
As can be seen in Figure 3, the neutral discourse coalition dramatically extended its range of 
arguments in phase 2, arguably, to attract wider support for its proposed compromise of a restrictive 
integration of REDD into carbon markets. This compromise unites arguments of market supporters 
and opponents. That is, the alleged financial benefits of markets are harnessed, while also assuring 
that this does not occur at the expense of global emission reduction targets. Not least, such a 
compromise aligns well with the overall most popular argument or master frame (Figure 1), i.e. that 
“industrialized countries should prioritize reducing their own emissions” as the imposed restrictions 
prevent industrialized countries from “getting away with” not reducing their own emissions through 
the purchase of REDD carbon credits.  
The use of a broader range of arguments by the neutral discourse coalition in phase 2 is similar 
to what sociologists would term a “frame extension” strategy (Benford & Snow, 2000). Political 
actors extend their argumentation to include the preferred frames of additional actors to win broader 
support for their cause. While this increases the likelihood of becoming the dominant coalition in the 
public debate (Leifeld & Haunss, 2012), it also carries the risk that contradictory arguments are 
endorsed, which may cause intra-coalition conflict. Indeed, the success of endorsing a restrictive 
integration of REDD into carbon markets at COP15 came at the price of continued tension within the 
Brazilian Federal Government, especially due to dissatisfaction among members of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
Beyond purely discursive explanations, a further factor in the present case may have been the 
specific historical context. The prospect of the upcoming COP15, widely expected to produce the 
next globally binding climate treaty at the time, created additional pressure to find a reasonable 
compromise solution. While the governors of Brazil’s Amazonian states could have championed 
carbon markets independently of the Federal Government at COP15, such a divided Brazilian 
delegation would have caused diplomatic embarrassment and prevented successful participation in 
the global negotiations in Copenhagen. In the language of the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
mentioned earlier, such a scenario is known as a “policy stalemate” (Sabatier & Weible, 2007), i.e. 
two opposing coalitions are set to lose if no new compromise policy can be found. In such a context, 
neutral actors or “policy brokers” may win over actors from opposing coalitions, which was indeed 
the case in Brazil at the time. The director of the NGO FAS (Amazonas Sustainable Foundation), 
Virgílio Viana, had been the first actor to propose a compromise solution as early as March 2009 
(Brücher Camara, 2009), which was eventually adopted in a similar form as Brazil’s official policy 
position in Copenhagen.4 Nevertheless, even in such a scenario, neutral actors require convincing 
discursive strategies, which were identified in the present article. 
By definition, a newspaper-based analysis of discourse networks can always only capture 
simplified versions of the public debate and explanations for policy stability and change. The findings 
presented here could be complemented with further research, for example a discursive-institutional 
analysis of the ways in which changes in the discourse were translated into novel rules and social 
practices (see e.g. Arts & Buizer, 2009) or semi-structured interviews with major stakeholders and 
decision-makers at the time (see e.g. Lahsen, 2009). Such interviews would be particularly useful to 
understand the extent to which the described change of policy can be attributed to factors beyond the 
                                                 
4 Viana was also instrumental in lobbying for the passing of a “REDD certification bill” in the Brazilian congress in 
2010 (Shankland & Hasenclever 2011), which can be interpreted as a form of discourse institutionalization (Arts & 
Buizer, 2009). 
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mere strength of arguments and story lines. For example, the role of influential individuals such as 
Carlos Minc, Minister of the Environment from May 2008 onwards, lobbying activities by 
agricultural producers and land-owners from the Amazon, or the importance of the creation of the 
above-mentioned joined task force by representatives of different government agencies in mid-2009 
could all be explored (see also Aamodt, 2018; Kasa, 2013; Viola & Franchini, 2014). 
 
Conclusions 
The question whether forest conservation should be funded by international carbon markets 
dominated the Brazilian public debate about REDD in the lead-up to the Copenhagen climate change 
conference in 2009, and remains controversial and relevant today. The present article presented a case 
study on the discursive strategies used by supporters and opponents of such market-based funding 
mechanisms in Brazil. With the aid of discourse network analytical tools and software, two main story 
lines for and against markets and three discourse coalitions (for, against, and neutral) were identified 
empirically, based on statements made by relevant political actors reported in 71 Brazilian newspaper 
articles. During a longer initial phase of policy stability, neither story line gained hegemony, despite 
constant argumentative competition between the two main discourse coalitions. In a shorter 
subsequent phase of policy change, however, a third neutral discourse coalition successfully adopted 
the main arguments of both sides, and achieved a compromise solution, which argued for an 
integration of REDD into carbon markets, but with some restrictions. The Brazilian Federal 
Government then adopted this proposal as its official position at COP15, despite having been opposed 
to carbon markets in relation to avoided deforestation for the preceding 12 years, sidelining the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the only time at a COP (Aamodt, 2018).  
  While such policy change is normally the result of many complex factors, it can be argued 
that the discursive strategy of the neutral discourse coalition represented a (temporary) success. From 
a theoretical perspective, it was able to extend its framing strategy to extend its power base, making 
use of the most popular arguments in the debate (cf. Leifeld & Haunss, 2012). Its proposed 
compromise connected especially well to the most central argument in the debate (as identified by 
the discourse network analysis), namely that industrialized countries should prioritize reducing their 
own emissions. 
A more general insight potentially gained here is that creating a negative story line alone is 
insufficient to support a policy position over the longer term, where competitors are able to create a 
convincing alternative positive discourse. In the present case study, the coalition against markets for 
REDD expressed many doubts about markets, but failed to mention any benefits of alternative policy 
options, such as the creation of a public fund for REDD. This is all the more remarkable given that 
such a fund was set up with donations from Norway and Germany in 2008 (van der Hoff et al., 2018), 
in the middle of the debate investigated here, and that the coalition against markets had the support 
of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which traditionally is the most influential actor in shaping 
Brazil’s international climate policy (Aamodt, 2018; Lahsen, 2009). This suggests that at least to 
some extent, the level of arguments and discourses may have contributed to a significant change of 
policy here. 
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supported a restrictive integration of REDD into carbon markets (which suggests neither full support nor opposition), then the actor 
was allocated to the neutral coalition.
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